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Background
Five years ago we began preliminary work to organize the difficult issues, associated with 
the six decade old confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. With the support of 
a number of private foundations, we were able, on several occasions, to gather together in 
Pittsburgh participant groups of equal size, consisting of people who were interested in 
and knowledgeable about this conflict. Over time these initial participants were replaced 
by citizens of Israel and of Palestinian residency. Finally, a group of prominent Israeli 
and Palestinian leaders were invited to complete the cycle. This latter group has worked 
together for several years and has developed trust and confidence in one another that 
facilitated their deliberations. These serious-minded and influential participants pro-
ceeded to pursue goals to provide decision makers with quantitatively based parameters 
with regard to the major issues involved in the conflict. The last two meetings were held 
in January and in April of 2014. A summary of how AHP can be used to resolve conflicts 
is shown in section two of this paper. Suffice it to say that the advantages which the AHP 
provides over face to face negotiations are critical intellectually and substantively.
These advantages include minimizing the emotional interplay between the par-
ties, accurately measuring the impact of intangible factors not previously considered, 
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providing an opportunity to consider every possible issue involved, identifying all con-
cessions that could be made by either party, no matter which party articulated them, 
providing an opportunity for tradeoffs between and among concessions, establishing 
values for each concession that create priorities expressing the importance, as accurately 
measured, of each factor involved, and using a hierarchical structure to establish the 
benefits, opportunities, costs and risks.
We began with testing how this retributive conflict (one in which both sides profess to 
desire a solution but were equally committed to inflicting pain on the other party) could be 
profitably addressed by the AHP, a mathematical theory concerned, among other factors, 
with the measurement of the crucial intangible criteria at the heart of this conflict. This paper 
can serve to illustrate how mathematics can help quantify the value of tradeoffs necessary to 
solve this impasse. Over the years, the AHP has been successfully applied in a wide variety of 
complex corporate and military decisions, involving resource allocation and prioritization of 
options, such as Poland’s decision not to join the Euro zone, and in some extremely sensitive 
political situations, such as the conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa.
We are not the only ones who believe that the Israeli Palestinian interaction is one of 
the most serious problems facing the world community. According to the philanthropist 
Jeffrey Skoll in a television interview, the five problems he’s convinced pose immediate 
danger to humanity are “climate change, water security, pandemics, nuclear proliferation 
and the Middle East conflict.” (Skoll 2013).
The analytic hierarchy process
A particular challenge for dealing with controversies as intractable as the Israeli–Pal-
estinian conflict is how to measure the intangible factors, which may even have more 
influence over the outcome than the tangible factors. AHP addresses this issue through 
the use of pairwise comparisons, because the importance of such factors changes from 
one problem to another. What is needed are relative priorities developed for each prob-
lem within the context of its own diversity of factors and their influences on the actors 
involved and the concessions that they exchange.
The Analytic Hierarchy modeling and measurement process (AHP) is a scientific 
approach used to determine the relative importance of a set of activities or criteria. The 
novel aspect and major distinction of this approach is that it structures any complex, multi-
person, multi-criteria, and multi-period problem hierarchically. Using a method for scaling 
the weights of the elements in each level of the hierarchy with respect to an element (e.g., 
a criterion or property they share) of the next higher level, a matrix of pairwise compari-
sons of the activities can be constructed, where the entries indicate the strength with which 
one element dominates another with respect to a given criterion. This scaling formulation 
is translated into a largest eigenvalue problem, which results in a normalized and unique 
vector of priority weights for each level of the hierarchy (always with respect to the criteria 
in the next level), which in turn results in a single composite vector of weights for the entire 
hierarchy. This vector measures the relative priority of all entities at the lowest level that 
enables the accomplishment of the highest objective of the hierarchy. These relative prior-
ity weights can provide guidelines for the allocation of resources among the entities at the 
lower levels of the hierarchy. When hierarchies are designed to reflect likely environmen-
tal scenarios, corporate objectives, current and proposed product/market alternatives, and 
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various marketing strategy options, the AHP can provide a framework and methodology for 
the determination of a number of key corporate and marketing decisions of the firm.
The AHP focuses on dominance matrices and their corresponding measurement- the 
ignored areas of research compared with the more popular proximity, profile, and con-
joint measurement approaches. It goes beyond the probability kind of comparative judg-
ment approach (which of two things is more likely to happen) by relaxing the assumption 
of normality on the parameters; e.g., equal variance and zero covariance and restriction 
of the type of comparisons. The Analytic Hierarchy develops the tradeoff in the course 
of structuring and analyzing a series of simple reciprocal pairwise comparison matrices. 
The AHP is based on three major components:
1. AHP begins by decomposing a complex problem into a hierarchy; each level consists 
of a few manageable elements and each element is, in turn, decomposed into another 
set of elements. The process continues down to the most specific elements of the 
problem, typically the specific courses of action considered, which are represented 
at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Structuring any decision problem hierarchically 
is an exercise in creative thinking and is an efficient way for dealing with complex-
ity and identifying the major components of the problem. There is no single general 
hierarchical structure, and one of the major attributes of the AHP is the flexibility it 
allows to construct a hierarchy to fit the idiosyncratic needs of the decision makers.
2. A measurement methodology is used to establish priorities among the elements 
within each stratum of the hierarchy. This is accomplished by asking the participants 
to evaluate each set of elements in a pairwise fashion with respect to each of the ele-
ments in a higher stratum. This measurement methodology provides the framework 
for deriving numerical priorities for ranking the alternatives of action.
3. Work for data collection and analysis constitutes the heart of the AHP. Structurally, 
the hierarchy is broken down into a series of paired comparison matrices, and the 
participants are asked to evaluate the off-diagonal relationship in one half of each 
matrix. Reciprocals are placed in the transposed positions, because if A is judged to 
be five times bigger than B, then B needs to be 1/5 as big as A.
Examples of how the AHP can be applied to a wide variety of problems are shown below.
Comparing five areas
Figure 1 shows five geometric areas to which we can apply the paired comparison pro-
cess to test the validity of the procedure. The object is to compare them in pairs for area 
by eyeballing them to reproduce the overall relative weights or priorities. The absolute 
numbers for each pairwise comparison are shown in Table 1. Inverses are automatically 
entered in the transpose position. We can approximate the priorities from this matrix 
by normalizing each column and then taking the average of the corresponding entries 
in the columns. Table 1 gives the actual measurements in relative form on the right. An 
element on the left is compared with another at the top as to its dominance. If it is not 
larger than one, the top element is compared with it and the reciprocal value is used.
In making paired comparisons one assigns numbers to judgments about dominance. An 
element compared with itself with respect to a certain criterion is always equal to 1. There-
fore, the main diagonal entries of the pairwise comparison matrix are all 1. The numbers 
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3, 5, 7, and 9 correspond to the verbal judgments “moderately more dominant”, “strongly 
more dominant”, “very strongly more dominant”, and “extremely more dominant”, with 2, 
4, 6, and 8 between the previous values. Reciprocal values are automatically entered in the 
transpose position. We are permitted to interpolate values between the integers, if desired 
or use numbers from an actual ratio scale of measurement. The AHP uses the integers 1 
to 9 as its Fundamental Scale of Absolute Numbers corresponding to the aforementioned 
verbal statements for the comparisons. This scale can be extended indefinitely by breaking 
things into clusters and using the largest element in one cluster as the smallest element in 
the next adjacent cluster, dividing all the priorities in the second cluster by this element’s 
value and then multiplying all values in the second cluster by the priority of that element in 
the first cluster so that common element has the same value in the two clusters and so on. 
Thus one continues to use the same 1–9 values to compare elements in new clusters.
Estimating US consumption of different drinks
A more abstract form of comparisons would involve elements with tangible properties 
that one must think about but cannot be perceived through the senses. See the judg-
ments in Table  2 for estimating the Relative Consumption of Drinks. An audience of 
about 30 people, using consensus to arrive at each judgment, provided judgments to 
estimate the dominance of the consumption of drinks in the United States (which drink 
is consumed more in the US and how much more than another drink?). The derived vec-
tor of relative consumption and the actual vector, obtained by normalizing the consump-
tion given in official statistical data sources, are at the bottom of the table.
Table 1 Judgments, outcomes, and actual relative sizes of the five geometric shapes
The next-to-last column in Table 1 gives the priorities derived from judgment




Circle 1 9 2 3 5 0.462 0.471
Triangle 1/9 1 1/5 1/3 1/2 0.049 0.050
Square 1/2 5 1 3/2 3 0.245 0.234
Diamond 1/3 3 2/3 1 3/2 0.151 0.149
Rectangle 1/5 2 1/3 2/3 1 0.093 0.096
Fig. 1 Five figures
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Note that while in the first example, Table 1, the eye perceives different size areas, in the 
second example, Table 2, the mind, through wide experience and education, has a feeling 
for how much more frequently one drink is consumed than the other is consumed, in a 
pairwise comparison. Feelings are usually distinguished qualitatively and associated with 
numerical values. It is fortunate, in this example, that people tend to consume nearly the 
same amount of liquid, about a glassful, of whatever kind of drink is being consumed. Esti-
mating the quantity of consumption is different than estimating frequency of consumption.
Buying the Best Car
How do we choose the best car from among three alternatives by considering differ-
ent importance priorities for the four criteria, some intangible and some tangible: pres-
tige, price, miles per gallon and comfort? We use the hierarchy in Fig. 2 to represent this 
decision.
Table 2 Relative consumption of drinks
Fig. 2 Three-level Hierarchy to Choose the Best Car
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The pairwise comparisons of the criteria are given in Table 3. Criteria must always be 
compared to derive their priorities. We then compare the alternatives with respect to 
the criteria in Table 4a–d. Table 5 gives the synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives 
shown in the next-to-last columns of Table 4a–d, multiplied by the priorities of the crite-
ria given in the last column of Table 3. The process of weighting, adding and normalizing 
priorities to one is called the distributive mode of synthesis. By contrast if one divides by 
the largest priority among the synthesized values, the result is called the ideal mode of 
synthesis. For more about synthesis modes see (Saaty 2005).
Psychologists have noted that there are two ways to make comparisons of alternatives. 
One is to compare them by considering each pair, as we have done above, and the other 
is to compare each alternative with an ideal one has in mind. Because, in the case of cars, 
Table 3 Pairwise comparisons of the criteria as to their importance in choosing a best car
Goal Prestige Price MPG Comfort Priorities
Prestige 1 1/4 1/3 1/2 0.099
Price 4 1 3 3/2 0.425
MPG 3 1/3 1 1/3 0.169
Comfort 2 2/3 3 1 0.308
Table 4 Comparisons of the alternatives with respect to the criteria
Prestige Acura TL Toyota Camry Honda Civic Priority Distributive Priority Ideal
(a) Comparison of cars with respect to prestige
 Acura TL 1 8 4 0.707 1
 Toyota Camry 1/8 1 1/4 0.07 0.099
 Honda Civic 1/4 4 1 0.223 0.315
(b) Comparison of cars with respect to price
 Acura TL 1 1/4 1/9 0.063 0.085
 Toyota Camry 4 1 1/5 0.194 0.261
 Honda Civic 9 5 1 0.743 1
(c) Comparison of cars with respect to MPG
 Acura TL 1 2/3 1/3 0.182 0.333
 Toyota Camry 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.273 0.5
 Honda Civic 3 2 1 0.545 1
(d) Comparison of cars with respect to comfort
 Acura TL 1 4 7 0.705 1
 Toyota Camry 1/4 1 3 0.211 0.299
 Honda Civic 1/7 1/3 1 0.084 0.119
Table 5 Synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives
The Honda Civic is the best car to buy because its overall priority is the largest
Priorities Prestige 0.099 Price 0.425 MPG 0.169 Comfort 0.308 Synthesis of  
Overall Priorities
Acura TL 0.707 0.063 0.182 0.705 0.342
Toyota Camry 0.070 0.194 0.273 0.211 0.204
Honda Civic 0.223 0.743 0.545 0.084 0.454
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we only know about the three cars we are considering, we make the best of them under 
each criterion the ideal for that criterion. To do that we divide the priorities under each 
criterion by the largest among them and that one becomes the ideal. This is shown in the 
last column of Table 4a–d. Using those values we have Table 6 to obtain the synthesis of 
the alternatives.
Note that the overall priorities are different but the ranks and the normalized priorities 
are the same in Tables 5 and 6, but they need not be. Frequently people prefer to use the 
answer in Table 6, because that way if more cars are added each is compared only with 
the ideal for that criterion and the rank of the three initial alternatives stays the same.
Actually, one would not interpret tangibles to make a decision for another person and 
often would use the actual measurements for those tangibles as indicators for their rela-
tive worth or importance. Thus, if instead of using judgments for the price, we use the 
ratio of the actual prices as shown in Table 7 (in fact, we use the inverses of these ratios 
because lower prices should have higher priorities) and then compute the priorities, we 
would obtain the same answer as simply normalizing the prices. In using direct data one 
must be careful to invert the priorities obtained if higher numbers mean less desirable.
With the ratio of the actual prices being used for the vector of priorities, Table 8 gives 
the overall priorities of the alternatives in the ideal mode.
In this case the Acura is slightly better than the Honda, but not by very much. As to 
be expected, the priorities in Table 8 are different from those in Table 6, obtained from 
judgments.
Table 6 Synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives using ideals to obtain the overall pri-
orities
Again, the Honda Civic is the best
Priorities Prestige 0.099 Price 0.425 MPG 0.169 Comfort 0.308 Overall priorities Normalized
Acura TL 1.000 0.085 0.333 1.000 0.499 0.342
Toyota Camry 0.099 0.261 0.500 0.299 0.297 0.204
Honda Civic 0.315 1.000 1.000 0.119 0.661 0.454













Acura TL 32,500 0.425 1/0.425 0.247 0.554
Toyota Camry 26,000 0.340 1/0.340 0.308 0.692
Honda Civic 18,000 0.235 1/0.235 0.445 1.000
Sum 76,500 1 0.00012479 1
Table 8 Ideal synthesis to obtain the priorities of the cars
Priorities Prestige 0.099 Price 0.425 MPG 0.169 Comfort 0.308 Overall Priorities Normalized 
to One
Acura TL 1.000 0.554 0.333 1.000 0.698 0.379
Toyota Camry 0.099 0.692 0.500 0.299 0.480 0.261
Honda Civic 0.315 1.000 1.000 0.119 0.661 0.359
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We note that in making comparisons, the value of any element depends on the value of 
what it is compared with. It is not like assigning it a number from a scale of measurement 
with an arbitrary unit. This led to a criticism about rank reversal when new alternatives are 
added or old ones deleted by those who, in single but nor multiple criteria rankings, were 
only used to assigning elements one at a time numbers from a scale. In multicriteria deci-
sions, for example, criteria need to always be compared because one cannot meaningfully 
assign importance to them, even if some people try doing it, and scales are then developed 
for each criterion separately. The answer to rank preservation or reversal does not lie in a 
mathematical theorem that says that rank must always be preserved. There are numerous 
examples that show that rank reversals can and should occur in practice (Saaty 2005).
To preserve rank, the ratings mode was developed by constructing through pairwise 
comparisons a rating scale for each criterion. These rating scales opened the door for using 
numerical data in normalized (by dividing each value by the sum of all the values) form, 
and also using mathematical functions as desired. Alternatives are then rated indepen-
dently, one at a time, by selecting the appropriate rating for it on each criterion. By pre-
evaluating ranges of data through expert judgment, it makes it possible to automate the 
process of evaluating data. Thus, one uses comparisons or ratings, depending on the cir-
cumstances. When the criteria are changeable, as in selecting the best CEO for a company, 
one uses comparisons and its corresponding method of synthesis, called the distributive 
mode. When the criteria are standardized, as in the admission of students to a university, 
evaluating projects or military officers, one uses ratings with its ideal mode, even when the 
ideal may change because of adding new alternatives never previously encountered or con-
ceived. Note: This is the method we use below to derive the priorities of the concessions 
with respect to benefits, costs, perceived benefits and costs in all the tables that follow.
Retributive conflicts and the AHP
There are two types of conflict resolution. We call the first kind constructive. It is what 
is conventionally treated in the so-called rational approach to conflict resolution. Each 
party identifies its demands, and it is assumed that a way can be found to satisfy both 
parties’ demands fairly. Fairly here means that each party forms a ratio of its benefits to 
those of the opponent and attempts to satisfy its own needs, at least as much as its per-
ceived evaluation of the opponent’s benefits, because the utilities or values may be inter-
preted differently by the two sides. The tug of war by each side can end up in equalizing 
the ratio to unity. That is why it is inadvisable for either party to give up too early.
In this case, negotiations begin with each party setting down what it expects to get. 
The negotiations may either result in getting that much, or changing the outcome so 
that both sides receive more, or often, less than their expectations because there is not 
enough to go around. The parties begin by offering some concessions from a larger set of 
concessions, which they maintain secretly. An offer is evaluated in terms of the benefits 
of the counter-offer received and may be withdrawn, if not reciprocated adequately.
The second kind of conflict is retributive with one or both parties harboring ill will 
towards each other. The idea is particularly relevant in long drawn-out conflicts, which 
in the end fester and create almost ineradicable resentments. Here a party may be willing 
to give up much of its demands, if misfortune can be brought to its opponent through 
some means, including justice as dispensed by the court system. Should the enemy die, 
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they may forgive and forget, or sometimes they may be resentful because they have not 
extracted their pound of flesh.
Thus, in negotiations, each party not only calculates the incremental benefits it gets, 
but also the costs to its opponent. The more of either, the greater is the gain. Gain is the 
product of the benefits to the party and the costs (whose aim may also be long-run ben-
efits) to the opponent. Each side must calculate what it estimates to be the opponent’s 
gain as a product of benefits to the opponent and costs to itself and make sure that the 
ratio of its gain to the opponent’s gain, which it considers as a loss, is greater than unity 
or not less than what the opponent is perceived to get. Thus, each party is concerned 
with maximizing its gains via its benefits and the costs to the opponent, and also by 
negotiating to increase this gain and decrease its loss (which is a gain to the opponent). 
When several concessions are considered simultaneously, sums of the products of ben-
efits and costs must be taken. We have the following ratios for the two parties A and B:
where ∑ is the sum taken over all concessions by B in the numerator and by A in the 
denominator. A’s perceived ratio for B is the reciprocal of the above.
where Σ is the sum taken over all concessions by A in the numerator and by B in the 
denominator. A’s perceived ratio for A is the reciprocal of the above. If both A and B’s 
perceive benefits and costs in the same way, these ratios would be reciprocals of each 
other. This almost never happens, however.
Obviously, each party would like its ratio to be as high as possible. If A`s ratio for some 
package is less than 1, then A will perceive B`s ratio as being greater than 1 and will 
feel that it has not been treated fairly. The aim must be to find single concessions and 
groups of concessions where each party perceives its own ratio to be greater than 1. This 
requires skilled mediation.
As just explained, each party calculates its gain as the product of its benefits and its 
perceived value of the costs to the opponent and its loss as the product of its costs and 
its perceived value of the benefits to the opponent. Thus, in a conflict resolution sce-
nario, wherein each party has a set of concessions to make, party A, for example, calcu-
lates the benefits it will accrue from B’s concessions to A, and its perception of the costs 
to B for these concessions.
Thus, there will ordinarily be four such calculations for each party and many more for 
a mediator, for example, who would use the judgments the parties give him and would 
compare them with his own perceptions; the mediator would then attempt to alter their 
perceptions or convince them that certain concessions are more to their advantage and 
advise them of the order in which such concessions should be made.
(as perceived by A)
A’s ratio
gain to A
A’s perception of gain to B
=
∑
A’s benefits× B’s costs
∑




(as perceived by B)
B’s ratio
gain to B
B’s perception of gain to A
=
∑
B’s benefits× A’s costs
∑
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If each of the ratios is perceived by the corresponding party to be less than unity, the 
problem is to alter these perceptions, so that both parties think that they are equally 
treated. By looking at their own ratio and the opponent’s ratio as perceived by them, 
which is the reciprocal of their ratio, the parties will tend to argue as follows: “Look what I 
am giving up. He gets high benefits and the costs to me are very high. He should be happy. 
On the other hand, look at what he is offering me. My benefits are low and the costs to 
him are very low. It is not a fair trade. He is not hurting enough in what he is offering me.”
Note that constructive conflict resolution is a special case of retributive conflict reso-
lution whereby the costs to the opponent are assigned a unit value. Each party assumes 
that the opponent is paying the full cost and concentrates on maximizing its own ben-
efits. He cannot assign any additional costs to the opponent.
The chief purpose of AHP is to provide decision makers with objective, numerical 
parameters regarding specific core issues. From such a valuation model, decision makers 
have access to a rationally based model/tool for addressing and resolving specific, com-
plex issues.
The primary benefit of the AHP as a tool for Middle East peace negotiators, whether 
used internally or together between the parties, is to reduce uncertainties—between 
and among the parties—on the relative value of core issues as negotiators address the 
“trade-off/exchange” component of negotiations. The information produced by this tool 
enhances rationally-based decision-making, helps reduce emotion in negotiations, and 
assesses more accurately the relative value that each group attaches to a particular issue.
The trade-off model is predicated upon development and application of a process that 
reflects both in-depth understanding of values attached by the respective parties (or 
sub-parties) to an issue, and the importance of that issue in relation to other issues, of 
lesser, similar, or greater value. Of equal importance is determining the value the other 
side attaches to that issue and the value both sides attach within the context of a trade-
off or trade-offs.
The process requires assigning numerical values that measure the respective impor-
tance of each issue for the parties involved; it is that assessment/assignment that ena-
bles rationally based decision-making in the context of potential trade-offs. AHP focuses 
on articulation and application of self-interest in a paradigm emphasizing trade-offs, 
whereby both sides seek to “expand the pie”—and avoid zero-sum calculations that 
emphasize maximization of benefits for one side, to the detriment of the other side.
The list of eight basic ideas behind the trade-offs is as follows:
1. Each party identifies a set of concessions (trade-offs). For example Tables 9 and 10 
reflect these basic ideas in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian controversy.
2. Each trade-off that a party gives away yields for that party a set of costs (not neces-
sarily monetary) and a perceived set of benefits for the party receiving it (Table 11).
3. Each trade-off that a party receives generates a set of benefits and a perceived set of 
losses for the party giving it away (Table 12).
4. The benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs are prioritized, using the 
AHP. (see the Priorities column in Tables 11 and 12).
5. The trade-offs are evaluated according to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits, and 
perceived costs (Table 13).
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Table 9 Possible Israeli concessions
Israelis’ concessions Description
1 Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State
2 Accept Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its outlets
3 Accept the historical responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem
4 Accept the Palestinian refugee rights to return
5 Accept to abide by the status quo in the holy places in Jerusalem
6 Accept to abolish the law of return
7 Accept to respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe pas-
sage between the two areas
8 Accept East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian State
9 Accept Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967
10 Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy places
11 Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians and Israelis
12 Comply with all applicable UN Resolutions
13 Evacuate settlers of Jewish settlements on land claimed by the Palestinians with or 
without compensation
14 Release all political prisoners including those who are Israeli citizens
15 Share Jerusalem as two capitals of two states
16 Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner
17 Stop incitement by the religious and national education and religious leaders in Israel 
against Muslims and Arabs
Table 10 Possible Palestinian concessions
Palestinians’ concessions Description
1 Accept mutually agreed upon land swap
2 Accept settlers under Palestinian sovereignty as residents
3 Accept the temporary presence of a multinational military monitoring system in 
Jordan Valley
4 Accept a Two-State solution
5 Accept a Two-State solution which includes a non-contiguous state
6 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish State
7 Acknowledge Israel’s existence as an independent state
8 Agree to compromise to the demand of the right of return
9 Agreeing with Palestinian demilitarized state
10 Preserve the status quo in the Holy places of Jerusalem
11 Allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace
12 Declare against Iranian nuclear development
13 Denounce and reign in violence
14 Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms and support Israelis effort to remove the 
threat
15 Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and Palestinians to have the right to return 
to their land of origin
16 Make compromises on the status of Jerusalem
17 Palestinians must guarantee that any agreement reached with Israel will be 
accepted and supported by the majority of the Palestinian people, both in Gaza 
and the West Bank
18 Refrain and work against any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools
19 Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugees
20 Sharing of natural resources
21 Work cooperatively and in active engagement w/Israel
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6. The trade-offs of the parties are paired to decide which pairs are acceptable. Accept-
able means that both parties benefit from the trade-off and that they receive more 
than they lose from the trade-off they give away. Acceptability of a pair of trade-offs 
Table 11 Israeli and Palestinian costs and perceived benefits
Priorities
Israeli costs from its concessions
 Integrity and unity of Israeli society post-agreement 0.0659
 Security 0.1831
 Strengthening the alliance with the United States 0.0457
 Make Israel more attractive to Jewish diaspora and Israelis citizens 0.0322
 End of claims and end of conflict 0.2093
 Legitimization of the State of Israel 0.0778
 Stop being occupiers 0.0477
 Peace, economy and stability in region 0.086
 Maintain the Jewish majority of Israel alongside with the Arab minority 0.2249
 Weakening the radical forces in the Middle East headed by Iran 0.0274
Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions
 Freedom, dignity and feeling of equality 0.1449
 Independent state 0.2145
 Evacuation of the settlers in the settlements 0.0661
 International recognition and permanent borders 0.0368
 Maximization of the area (land) 0.0816
 Economic stability and prosperity 0.0219
 East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine 0.1361
 Solve the Refugee problem 0.2128
 Control of the Muslim holy places 0.0853
Palestinian costs from its concessions
 Conflict between Palestinian diaspora and the internal leadership 0.0948
 Giving up the claim over historic Palestine occupied in 1948 and known later as the State of Israel 0.2055
 Partial loss/depletion of natural resources by sharing them with Israel 0.1257
 Loss of military capability to defend the State of Palestine 0.0575
 Territorial loss as a result of unfair land swap 0.2173
 Accommodation and rehabilitation of Palestinian refugees not allowed to return to Israel 0.1192
 Restrictions on national sovereignty by accepting demilitarization and multinational monitoring 0.1013
 Loss of property rights 0.0395
 Dislocation and fragmentation of Palestinian social fabric 0.0392
Palestinian perception of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions
 Gaining legitimacy of the Palestinian and Arab and Muslim world 0.1111
 Integration in the Middle East with normal relations with its neighbors and Arab World 0.0658
 End of claims by the Palestinians 0.2556
 Obtaining security by acceptance and recognition of the Palestinian and Arab and Muslim world 0.108
 Sharing the Palestinians with their own natural resources 0.0215
 Obtaining territorial gains 0.1184
 Economic relations and new markets including tourism with neighboring Arab and Islamic coun-
tries
0.0999
 Reduction of military expenditures enabling national development 0.0239
 Regional cooperation against external threats 0.0333
 Acknowledgement of Israeli control over the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of 
Jerusalem
0.1626
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is implemented using a gain-loss ratio. Gain-loss ratios are not symmetric for the 
parties.
7. Acceptable pairs of trade-offs are identified with the additional condition that the 
gain-loss ratio of a pair of concessions is as close as possible for the parties (i.e., 
within a small percentage of each other). Total equality in the tradeoffs is highly 
unlikely because of computational imprecision.
8. If the gain-loss ratios for all the acceptable pairs of trade-offs are as close as possible, 
the totality of the pairs of trade-offs should be as close as possible, and the agreement 
should be balanced (Fig. 3).
Table 12 Israeli and Palestinian benefits and perceived costs
Priorities
Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions
 Integrity and unity of Israeli society post agreement 0.0753
 Security 0.1636
 Strengthening the alliance with the United States 0.0477
 Make Israel more attractive to Jewish diaspora and Israelis citizens 0.0397
 End of claims 0.2216
 Legitimization of the State of Israel 0.0654
 Stop being occupiers 0.0529
 Peace, prosperity and stability in region 0.0959
 Maintain the Jewish majority of Israel alongside with the Arab minority 0.1899
 Weakening the radical forces in the Middle East headed by Iran 0.0479
Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions
 Giving up on the Idea of a Greater Palestine 0.088
 Remainder of part of the Settlement Community 0.0964
 Loss of ‘victim’ status 0.0288
 Loss of land (67 Border)/swap 0.15
 Loss of International financial support 0.0252
 Partial control of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine 0.1735
 Partial solution refuge problem 0.3101
 Partial control of the Muslim holy places 0.128
Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions
 Permanent borders 0.2095
 Sovereign Palestinian State 0.2054
 Share of water and other resources 0.0181
 Resolution of the refugee problem 0.0654
 Shared control of Jerusalem and holy places 0.0613
 International guarantees and assurances to protect Palestine State security and integrity 0.0403
 Evacuation of the Israeli settlements 0.0415
 Having full control over air space, maritime, borders and outlets 0.1086
 Release of political prisoners including those who are Israeli citizens 0.0186
 Respect the integrity of West Bank and Gaza 0.0571
 Stop incitement and raging hatred 0.0087
 East Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine 0.1654
Palestinian perception of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions
 Changing of Zionist narrative 0.4541
 Property restitution and compensation 0.0689
 Settlements evacuation 0.2723
 Rehabilitating evacuated settlers from the Palestinian territories 0.2047
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Table 13 Evaluation of Trade-offs



















 1 1 1 1000 0.8875 0.9683 859.43
 2 0.6445 0.7637 492.18 0.9892 0.9717 961.20
 3 0.9051 0.2705 244.88 0.9565 0.7835 749.44
 4 0.9470 0.8253 781.53 0.8884 0.9515 845.25
 5 0.1961 0.5405 106.01 0.8008 0.7583 607.29
 6 0.8824 0.4280 377.70 0.5455 0.7410 404.22
 7 0.1984 0.5149 102.15 0.9838 0.9054 890.73
 8 0.8299 0.8068 669.54 1 0.9692 969.17
 9 0.0545 0.8205 44.75 0.9829 0.9080 892.42
 10 0.1006 0.5323 53.55 0.8053 0.5459 439.65
 11 0.1120 0.2853 31.96 0.6691 0.5260 351.93
 12 0.8596 0.9571 822.76 0.9847 0.9075 893.59
 13 0.3593 0.8915 320.31 0.9310 1 930.98
 14 0.5178 0.4781 247.56 0.7528 0.6508 489.95
 15 0.1633 0.6027 98.42 0.8472 0.7334 621.31
 16 0.1806 0.7329 132.34 0.8884 0.9174 815.03




















 1 0.9349 0.2000 186.95 0.9233 0.6353 586.55
 2 0.8877 0.2000 177.51 0.2333 0.4743 110.66
 3 0.8101 0.2000 161.99 0.7033 0.1106 77.80
 4 0.8518 0.8947 762.13 0.9944 0.1660 165.08
 5 0.8438 0.2000 168.74 0.7543 0.3011 227.15
 6 0.9035 0.9345 844.30 0.8741 1 874.13
 7 0.8635 0.2000 172.67 0.8055 0.6196 499.09
 8 0.9298 0.9572 889.98 1 0.8557 855.72
 9 0.8718 0.2000 174.33 0.5968 0.1353 80.74
 10 0.7691 0.2331 179.27 0.7031 0.3355 235.85
 11 0.8957 0.2000 179.12 0.6592 0.1096 72.28
 12 0.5522 0.2000 110.42 0.3968 0.0348 13.81
 13 0.6878 0.2000 137.54 0.6153 0.1119 68.87
 14 0.5098 0.2000 101.95 0.4967 0.0443 22.00
 15 0.8119 0.2000 162.35 0.2009 0.3663 73.61
 16 1 1 1000.00 0.9251 0.6221 575.49
 17 0.5796 0.2000 115.90 0.8541 0.5253 448.69
 18 0.7352 0.2000 147.01 0.7583 0.1871 141.88
 19 0.8621 0.3908 336.96 0.9572 0.8724 835.03
 20 0.8158 0.2000 163.14 0.4069 0.0544 22.14
 21 0.2000 0.2000 39.99 0.7613 0.1858 141.44
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All the critical issues in the conflict: the declaration of the Pittsburgh principles
The data developed above in “Retributive conflicts and the AHP” provided a veritable 
trove of practical information not previously available to the participants, but based on 
their own judgments they were now able to understand their own and their protagonists 
priorities on a wide variety of issues. It became apparent as to which issue on either side 
had the highest priority for each side, directly asking the question as to what was most 
important and least important would not have yielded an accurate statement of the trues 
priorities. The AHP approach addresses such questions in an oblique manner and cre-
ates a reality that is far more accurate than trying to achieve an accurate statement by 
either party. The pairwise comparison approach yielded results which gives each party 
the kind of understanding of the true problem that can be rarely achieved in face to face 
negotiations.
Armed with this data, the participants began to consider where agreement might be 
reached on certain general principles. It became clear that the general principles would 
be helpful in considering general issues. With full recognition that the devil is in the 
details, the participants spent considerable time in honing a set of principles that could 
be agreed upon, word by word, based on knowledge that the AHP approach could 
provide.
After long hours of interaction, the following general principles, dubbed the Pitts-
burgh Principles were developed. While it would be presumptuous to suggest that these 
principles would create a solution to the controversy, participants on both sides felt that 
the statement of the principles provided a great deal that had eluded the face to face 
negotiators. All involved understood that the most difficult task of implementing the 
general principles remained to be addressed. The general principles agreed upon were 
as follows:

















IR – Israeli ratios, PR – Palestinian ratios
Fig. 3 A balanced agreement. IR Israeli ratios, PR Palestinian ratios
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 1. A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with mutually agreed 
upon land swaps.
 2. Israel must respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe 
passage between the two areas, and the Palestinian State must guarantee that any 
agreement reached with Israel will be accepted and supported by the majority of the 
Palestinian people both in Gaza and the West Bank.
 3. East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian State. The parties will maintain the 
status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.
 4. Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish State, without jeopardizing the rights of 
its minority Israeli citizens.
 5. Evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Palestinian territories that are not included in 
the land swap.
 6. Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its outlets, and 
deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring system 
in the Jordan Valley.
 7. Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner.
 8. Limited arms of the Palestinian state and international guarantees from the interna-
tional community against aggression from other parties.
 9. Agreed upon international monitoring mechanism and agreed upon binding inter-
national arbitration mechanisms.
 10. The full implementation of these principles concludes end of the conflict and claims 
of the two parties.
Implementation steps
In recent months the participants have focused exclusively on developing an implementa-
tion plan for each of the Pittsburgh Principles. The outcome of these discussions, using 
AHP methodology, resulted in a detailed agreement reflecting each of the Pittsburgh 
Principles, except for #7 which reads “solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and 
agreed upon manner”. This Principle was addressed in an initial implementation mode, 
but was so complex that we achieved only a few agreed upon details. Several more meet-
ings are planned to complete a fully implementable implementation plan for this princi-
ple. Nevertheless, what has been agreed upon so far addresses some of the relevant issues.
While even a detailed implementation plan will require further discussion between 
the parties, the participants in our study, who are significant members of the Israeli and 
Palestinian communities, believe that the level of detail presented below will facilitate 
agreement on these issues, even if some modifications are required.
Principle 1 A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with mutually 
agreed upon land swaps.
The first principle proved to be a difficult statement to implement because it essen-
tially sought to determine the borders of the two entities, a very controversial issue. The 
participants struggled with an implementation statement, but then decided that a small 
subgroup would meet separately to try and agree upon the principles for land swaps.
In a meeting in October of 2013 a subcommittee of the participants met at an undis-
closed location to draft implementation principles for a land swap. The entire partici-
pant group rewrote this material in the format given below.





  • A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with minimal, mutually 
agreed upon land swap of the same size and of equal value for both sides.
  • Territorial contiguity of both states is a principle of importance for both sides.
  • Land swap between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in a manner benefi-
cial to both sides.
  • Systematic and time limited process for implementing land swap.
  • No swap of land for money.
  • No empty Palestinian land or land populated by Palestinians, for swap.
  • Tradeoff issues that go beyond land for land could be discussed and should be mutu-
ally agreed upon.
  • Maximum number of Israeli citizens and minimum Palestinian land to be annexed 
with proximity to the 1967 line.
  • East Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank.
  • Jewish neighborhoods built in East Jerusalem after 1967 will be part of the land swap.
  • The passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will be part of the land swap.
Jerusalem
Overall arching values relevant to Jerusalem.
  • One city two capitals.
  • The capital of the State of Palestine will be in East Jerusalem.
  • Contiguity of neighborhoods for both sides (minimize isolation of communities).
  • Mutually agreed arrangement for the Old City.
  • Both sides will work towards agreed upon procedures and arrangements to enable 
the citizens of the two countries to have access to the city of Jerusalem.
  • No Israeli population evacuation with the option of staying under Palestinian sover-
eignty as individual residents respecting and abiding by Palestinian laws.
  • Palestinians living in Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem will not be evacuated and 
will live under Israeli sovereignty.
  • Develop road links wherever necessary.
West Bank
  • Israel is responsible to evacuate the settlers who refuse to comply with the agreement.
  • The State of Palestine will take full responsibility for the safety of Israeli citizens who 
choose to stay under Palestinian sovereignty as residents on equal footing with its 
own citizens.
  • The State of Israel will take full responsibility for the safety of Palestinian citizens who 
choose to stay under Israel sovereignty as residents on equal footing with its own citizens.
  • Israel will refrain from any settlement activities in the West Bank or East Jerusalem 
during the implementation of the agreement.
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Character Est. Fence [7] Council Subarea or 
bloc
3 Adora 278 159 Secular 1984 E Har Hebron West
4 Alei Zahav 462 255 Secular 1982 W Shomron Western S.
5 Alfei 
Menashe
7574 1085 Secular 1983 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
6 Alon Shvut 3066 643 Religious 1970 W Gush Etzion Etzion
7 Almog 178 111 Secular 1977 V Megilot Dead Sea
8 Almon 1132 376 Secular 1982 W Binyamin Adumim
9 Arg aman 132 165 Secular 1968 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley




469 178 Orthodox 1983 E Gush Etzion Judean Mtns
12 Ateret 775 235 Religious 1981 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Western B.
13 Avnat 119 1983 V Megilot Dead Sea
14 Avnei Hefetz 1614 493 Religious 1990 E Shomron Western S.
15 Barkan 1502 349 Secular 1981 W Shomron Western S.
16 Bat Ayin 1117 239 Religious 1989 W Gush Etzion Etzion
17 Beit Aryeh 4166 960 Secular 1981 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
18 Beit El 5897 944 Religious 1977 E Mateh Biny-
amin
[8] Ramallah
19 Beit HaArava 119 280 Secular 1980 V Megilot Dead Sea
20 Beit Horon 1149 181 Mixed 1977 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Giv’on
21 Beit Yatir 
(Mezadot 
Yehuda)
399 170 Religious 1983 W Har Hebron South
22 Beitar Illit 42,467 1773 Orthodox 1985 W Gush Etzion Etzion [9]
23 Beka’ot 175 120 Secular 1972 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
24 Carmei Tzur 872 160 Religious 1984 E Gush Etzion Etzion
25 Carmel 378 177 Religious 1981 E Har Hebron South
26 Dolev 1306 355 Religious 1983 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Western B.
27 East Talpiot 13,984 1195 Secular 1967 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
28 Efrat(a) 7812 1090 Religious 1980 W Gush Etzion Etzion [8]
29 El’azar 2302 256 Religious 1975 W Gush Etzion Etzion
30 Eli 3521 776 Mixed 1984 E Shomron Eli
31 Elkana 3860 758 Religious 1977 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
32 Elon Moreh 1632 419 Religious 1979 E Shomron Nablus
33 Immanuel 3660 328 Orthodox 1983 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
34 Einav 662 158 Religious 1981 E Shomron Enav
35 Eshkolot 510 133 Secular 1982 W Har Hebron South
36 Etz Efraim 864 184 Mixed 1985 W Shomron Western S.








Character Est. Fence [7] Council Subarea or 
bloc
37 French Hill 
(Giv’at 
Shapira)
8660 2018 Secular 1969 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem




4674 728 Secular 1984 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Ramallah
40 Gilual, Bik’at 
HaYarden
167 570 Secular 1970 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
41 Gilo 29,559 2859 Secular 1973 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem





2944 1970 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem





1131 226 Secular 1980 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Giv’on
46 Hagai 541 233 Religious 1984 E Har Hebron Hebron
47 Hallamish 1144 450 Religious 1977 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Western B.
48 Hamra 110 133 Secular 1971 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
49 Har Adar 
(Giv’at Ha 
Radar)
3701 969 Secular 1986 W Mateh Biny-
amin
[8] Giv’on
50 Har Brakha 1769 258 1983 E Shomron Nablus
51 Har Gilo 952 127 Secular 1972 W Gush Etzion Etzion
52 Har Homa, 
Givat 
Hamatos
9811 2523/310 Religious 1997 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
53 Hashmonaim 2573 835 Religious-
Orthodox
1985 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Modi’in
54 Hebron 850 1980 E Har Hebron Hebron [11]
55 Hemdat 
(Nahal)
186 82 N/A 1980 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
56 Hermesh 189 134 Secular 1982 E Shomron Rehan
57 Hinanit 945 280 Mixed 1981 W Shomron Rehan
58 Homesh 0 157 Secular 1980 E Shomron Northern S.
59 Itamar 1024 253 Religious 1984 E Shomron Nablus
60 Kadim 0 148 Secular 1983 E Shomron Northern S.
61 Kalia 360 537 Secular 1968 V Megilot Dead Sea
62 Karnei Shom-
ron
6570 1351 Mixed 1978 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
63 Kedar 1246 251 Secular 1985 W Gush Etzion Adumim
64 Kedumim 4124 1003 Mixed 1977 W Shomron Kedumim [8]
65 Kfar Adumim 3527 921 Mixed 1979 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Adumim
66 Kfar Etzion 975 445 Religious 1967 W Gush Etzion Etzion
67 Kfar Tapuach 1207 156 Religious 1978 E Shomron Western S.
68 Kiryat Arba 7593 882 Mixed 1972 E Har Hebron Hebron [8]












749 162 Religious 1983 W Shomron Western S.
70 Kokhav 
HaShahar







6476 756 Religious 1985 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Ramallah





36,862 3589 Mixed 1975 W Gush Etzion 
[9]
Adumim
74 Ma’ale Amos 350 155 Orthodox 1981 E Gush Etzion Judean Mtns















1251 216 Mixed 1980 W Shomron Western S.
79 Ma’alot 
Dafna
2720 380 Secular 1972 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
80 Ma’on 454 173 Religious 1981 E Har Hebron South
81 Maskiot 132 32 1986 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
82 Massu’a 153 160 Secular 1970 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
83 Matityahu 568 195 Religious 1981 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Modi’in
84 Mehola 429 190 N/A 1968 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
85 Mekhora 112 132 Secular 1973 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
86 Menora 2644 453 Secular 1998 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Modi’in
87 Mevo Dotan 276 122 Secular 1978 E Shomron Rehan
88 Mevo Horon 2147 519 Religious 1970 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Modi’in
89 Migdal Oz 512 576 Religious 1977 W Gush Etzion Etzion






173 151 Secular 1971 V Megilot Dead Sea
93 Mitzne 
Yericho
2115 564 Religious 1978 V Mateh Biny-
amin
Jordan
94 Modi’in Illit 55,494 1606 Orthodox 1996 W Mateh Biny-
amin
Modi’in [8]
95 Na’ale 1203 349 Secular 1988 E Mateh Biny-
amin
96 Nahliel 496 114 Orthodox 1984 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Western B.








Character Est. Fence [7] Council Subarea or 
bloc
97 Negohot 258 90 Religious 1999 E Har Hebron West
98 Nativ HaG-
dud
162 1042 Secular 1976 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
99 Neve Daniel 2058 263 Religious 1982 W Gush Etzion Etzion
100 Neve Yaakov 19,703 1759 Secular 1972 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
101 Nili 968 282 Secular 1981 E Mateh Biny-
amin
102 Niran 69 302 Secular 1977 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
103 Nofim 437 248 Secular 1987 W Shomron Western S.
104 Nokdim 1561 440 Mixed 1982 E Gush Etzion Judean Mtns
105 Na’omi 98 280 Secular 1982 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
106 Ofarim n/a 351 Secular 1989 W Mateh Biny-
amin
107 Ofra 3489 1012 Religious 1975 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Ramallah
108 Old City Jew-
ish Quarter
3105 156 Orthodox Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
109 Oranit 7195 878 Mixed 1985 W Shomron Western S. 
[8]
110 Otniel 927 291 Religious 1983 E Har Hebron South
111 Peduel 1315 171 Religious 1984 W Shomron Western S.
112 Ma’ale Hever 
(Peneh 
Hever)
398 110 Religious 1982 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Ramallah
113 Peza’el 216 319 Secular 1975 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
114 Pisgat Ze’ev 44,512 5467 Secular 1985 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
115 Psagot 1728 234 Religious 1981 E Har Hebron Hebron




14,554 741 Orthodox 1995 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
118 Ramot Alon 41,410 2558 Orthodox 1974 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
119 Rehan 174 90 Secular 1977 W Shomron Rehan
120 Revava 1545 160 Religious 1991 W Shomron Western S.
121 Rimonim 572 314 Secular 1977 V Mateh Biny-
amin
Jordan
122 Ro’i 154 134 Secular 1976 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
123 Rosh Tzurim 855 320 Religious 1969 W Gush Etzion Etzion
124 Sanhedria 
Murhevet
4094 378 1970 W Jerusalem East Jerusa-
lem
125 Sa-Nur 0 44 Secular 1982 E Shomron Northern S.
126 Sal’it 542 256 Secular 1977 W Shomron Enav
127 Sha’are Tikva 5100 915 Mixed 1983 W Shomron Western S.
128 Shadmot 
Mehola
512 159 N/A 1979 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
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Today there are 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank (see Table  14) and an 
unknown number of outposts. Israel wants to annex 43 of the settlements in exchange 
for land in other parts of Israel (see Table 15). The other settlements will have to be dis-
posed of appropriately. These settlements contain about 74.58 % of the population in the 
settlements, and cover an area of approximately 3.1 % of the area of the West Bank or 
182 sq. km. The maps in Figs. 4 and 5 show the settlements in Table 10 (marked in yel-
low) to be annexed by Israel in this solution.
Figure 6 contains the map of territories proposed by Israeli participants for land swap 
in exchange for the territories annexed in Table 15 and depicted in Figs. 4 and 5. The 
proposed land swap alternatives were evaluated in Table 16.
Result
The total area to be annexed by Israel is 3.1 % of the West Bank or 182 km2. The cor-
responding land from the sites prioritized above is selected by using the quality points 
from the final scores as follows: Beit Shean Valley (18 km2), Gaza Envelop (67.7 km2), 
Judea Plain (63.4 km2) and Northern Negev (32.9 km2).
Principle 2 Israel must respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing 








Character Est. Fence [7] Council Subarea or 
bloc
129 Shaked 724 206 Secular 1981 W Shomron Rehan
130 Shani 430 30 Secular 1989 W Har Hebron South
131 Shavei 
Shomron
745 272 Religious 1977 E Shomron Western S.
132 Shilo 2706 482 Religious 1979 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Eli
133 Shim’a 375 212 Secular 1985 E Har Hebron South
134 Shvut Rachel 400 1991 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Eli
135 Susiya 950 352 Religious 1983 E Har Hebron South
136 Talmon 3202 1135 Religious 1989 E Mateh Biny-
amin
Western B.
137 Tekoa 2518 402 Mixed 1977 E Gush Etzion Judean Mtns
138 Telem 241 117 Secular 1982 E Har Hebron West
139 Tene Omarim 658 272 Secular 1983 E Har Hebron South
140 Tomer 228 362 Secular 1978 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
141 Vered Jericho 221 274 Secular 1980 V Megilot Dead Sea
142 Yafit 124 352 Secular 1980 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
143 Yakir 1645 342 Religious 1981 W Shomron Western S.
144 Yitav 195 170 Secular 1970 V Bik’at 
HaYarden
Jordan Valley
145 Yitzhar 1172 269 Religious 1983 E Shomron Nablus
146 Zofin 1484 219 Mixed 1989 W Shomron Kedumim
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7574 1085 Secular 1983 w Shomron Western S. 
[8]
y
Alon Shvut 3066 643 Religious 1970 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion y






399 170 Religious 1983 w Har 
Hebron
South y
Beitar lllit 42,467 1773 Orthodox 1985 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion [9] y
East Talpiot 13,984 1195 Secular 1967 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
Efrat(a) 7812 1090 Religious 1980 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion [8] y
El’azar 2302 256 Religious 1975 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion y
Elkana 3860 758 Religious 1977 w Shomron Western S. 
[8]
y
Eshkolot 510 133 Secular 1982 w Har 
Hebron
South y




8660 2018 Secular 1969 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y





2944 1970 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
































Hinanit 945 280 Mixed 1981 w Shomron Rehan y
Kfar Etzion 975 445 Religious 1967 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion y











2720 380 Secular 1972 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y




















Migdal Oz 512 576 Religious 1977 w Gush 
Etzion
Etzion y











19,703 1759 Secular 1972 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
Oranit 7195 878 Mixed 1985 w Shomron Western S. 
[8]
y










14,554 741 Orthodox 1995 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
Ramot Alon 41,410 2558 Orthodox 1974 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
Rehan 174 90 Secular 1977 w Shomron Rehan y
Rosh 
Tzurim





4094 378 1970 w Jerusalem East Jeru-
salem
y
Sal’it 542 256 Secular 1977 w Shomron Enav y
Sha’are 
Tikva
5100 915 Mixed 1983 w Shomron Western S. y
Shaked 724 206 Secular 1981 w Shomron Rehan y
Shani 430 30 Secular 1989 w Har 
Hebron
South y
















Population 405,471 74.58 %
Relocated 138,195 25.42 %
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Fig. 4 Settlements to be annexed by Israel in the West Bank
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that any agreement reached with Israel will be accepted and supported by the majority 
of the Palestinian people both in Gaza and the West Bank.
The implementation of Principle 2 reflects the feeling of both parties that any peace 
agreement should be subject to a referendum in each society so that the will of the 
Fig. 5 Settlements to be annexed by Israel in East Jerusalem
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people of both communities becomes apparent. The consensus of the representatives 
from both sides was that a significant proportion of their respective populations desired 
peace, if given the opportunity on a plan their leaders approve. Further, the Israeli rep-
resentatives agreed that there should be free passage between Gaza and the West Bank 
without any restrictions in moving from one area to the other. This meant that some sort 
of corridor over Israeli land would be required.
Principle 3 East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian State. The parties will main-
tain the status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.
The participants agreed on the following principles for the historic area of Jerusalem.
Fig. 6 Israeli territories proposed for land swap
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Principles and special arrangements for the historic area of Jerusalem
1. The ‘Historic Area’ includes Mt. Zion, the Kidron Valley, the Jewish Cemetery in the 
Mt. of Olives, the City of King David and the Old City as shown in Fig. 7.
2. This area will function in the model of “Open City”. Citizens of either party may not 
exit this area into the territory of the other party.
3. Upon the implementation of the principles, Palestine will assume sovereignty over 
the entire area, excluding the Jewish Quarter and Mount Zion (as in Fig. 8).
4. Palestinians will have control over the Haram al-Sharif and Israelis will have control 
over the Wailing Wall (no one will have sovereignty over these sites).
5. The religious status quo and particularly the existing arrangements pertaining to the 
exercise of religious practices will remain.
Table 16 Land swap evaluation



































0.6 0.79 0.86 0.79 0.9 0.95 0.83
Judea Plain Agriculture 
pasture 
lands
0.8 0.79 0.56 0.56 0.79 0.82 0.71


















0.6 0.5 0.21 0.38 0.5 0.44 0.45

















0.9 0.82 0.69 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.81
 Halutza 
Sands
178.1 Aquifer 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0
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6. The implementation of these principles will be carried out according to the following 
three stages. A detailed time table will be agreed upon by the parties:
a. Redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces and Israeli population from the Pales-
tinian areas.
b. A multinational force will help assume responsibility in the territory pertaining to 
the Palestinians.
c. The State of Palestine assumes full control over its part of the area.
Fig. 7 Historic area of Jerusalem
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In addition, to the agreed upon facts noted above, the participants developed a series 
of actions (concessions) for each side. Next, the concessions were prioritized with 
respect to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs. Tables 17 and 18 
summarize the priorities assigned and represent the judgments of the participants using 
the ratings approach of the AHP.
The priorities of the concessions with respect to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits 
and perceived costs (see Table 19) are combined to produce the gain ratios used to make 
trade-offs among the concessions. In this principle a pair of concessions, considered as a 
bundle, is traded as shown below.
As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will 
be as follows:
Israeli actions
  • Rescind all legal and administrative measures and orders legislated by Israel since 1967.
  • Preserve and respect the status quo of the holy places in the city as decreed and 
accepted by the Ottomans and the international community in 1856.
Palestinian actions
  • Full Palestinian cooperation during transfer of power and beyond it.
  • Acceptance of international monitoring on the compliance of the transfer of power 
process.
Principle 4 Acknowledge Israel’s Existence as a Jewish State without jeopardizing the 
rights of its minority Israeli citizens.
Fig. 8 The Holy Basin
Page 31 of 53Saaty et al. Decis. Anal.  (2015) 2:7 
This principle does not deny non-Jewish Israeli citizens the full rights of Israeli citizenship.
Principle 5 Evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Palestinian territories who are not 




2. Social and economic benefits.
Table 17 Summary of assigned priorities (Israeli perspective) for Principle 3
Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2
Accepting the global recognition of Jerusalem (in its new borders) as the 
capital of Israel
0.2812 0.6 0.688
Increasing international and regional support for Israel 0.1508 0.75 0.663
Transfer of full governmental and municipal responsibility for the Palestinian 
residents of Eastern Jerusalem, while sharing social costs
0.0587 0 0
Security 0.0481 0 0
Receiving international legitimization to the Jewish neighborhood in East 
Jerusalem
0.2189 0.625 0.575
Strengthen Israeli democracy 0.2423 0.438 0.055
0.5246 0.4324
Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Hurting the feelings of the global Jewish people by conceding on the right 
of Jews to live everywhere in Jerusalem
0.2255 0.402 0.875 0.12
Increasing potential friction due to the dual management of the city, 
increasing inefficiencies
0.1582 0.173 0.967 0.12
Hindering the ability to effectively zone and plan super-infrastructure inside 
and around Jerusalem
0.0954 0.283 0.533 0.287
Loss of security control 0.4271 0.317 0.587 0.67
Loss of demographic control 0.0938 0.37 0.503 0.553
0.3152 0.6989 0.4115
Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Fulfill our national aspiration and dignity 0.3699 0.503 0.667 0.637
Enforcing the Palestinian national identity 0.2964 0.587 0.367 0.587
Free worship of the three monotheistic religions 0.0562 0 0 0
Social benefit by preserving the social fabric 0.1266 0.387 0.07 0.203
Economic benefit by developing the tourism industry and other aspects of 
life in the city
0.1509 0.1 0.07 0.583
0.4241 0.3747 0.5232
Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2
Political costs by accepting compromise within the land swap approach on 
parts of the city where Israeli settlements exist
0.5905 0.883 0.367
Limiting the potential urban, economic and social development of the city 





P1. Full Palestinian cooperation during transfer of power and beyond it
P2. Accepting international monitoring on the compliance of the transfer of power 
process
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3. Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces.
4. Allow Israel to define its borders.
5. Increased international support.
6. Strengthen the democratic nature of the state of Israel.
Costs 
1. Economic cost to relocate the settlers.
2. Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror.
Table 18 Summary of Assigned Priorities (Palestinian Perspective) for Principle 3
Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Fulfill our national aspiration and dignity 0.2989 1 1 1
Enforcing the Palestinian national identity 0.4114 1 1 1
Free worship of the three monotheistic religions 0.0901 1 0.9 1
Social benefit by preserving the social fabric 0.0679 0.9 0.9 0.9
Economic benefit by developing the tourism industry and other aspects of 
life in the city
0.1317 1 1 0.9
0.9932 0.9842 0.98
Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2
Political costs by accepting compromise within the land swap approach on parts 
of the city where Israeli settlements exist
0.125 0.5 0.5
Limiting the potential urban, economic and social development of the city aris-




Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2
Accepting the global recognition of Jerusalem (in its new borders) as the 
Capital of Israel
0.5039 0.9 0.9
Increasing international and regional support for Israel 0.065 0.9 0.75
Transfer of full governmental and municipal responsibility for the Palestinian 
residents of Eastern Jerusalem, while sharing social costs
0.0352 0.9 0.9
Security 0.114 0.9 0.75
Receiving international legitimization to the Jewish neighborhood in East 
Jerusalem
0.2616 0.9 0.75
Strengthen Israeli democracy 0.0204 0.5 0.5
0.8919 0.8258
Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Hurting the feelings of the global Jewish people by conceding on the right 
of Jews to live everywhere in Jerusalem
0.2561 0.9 0.9 0.5
Increasing potential friction due to the dual management of the city, 
increasing inefficiencies
0.2519 0.75 0.5 0.5
Hindering the ability to effectively zone and plan super-infrastructure inside 
and around Jerusalem
0.2046 0.75 0.75 0.75
Loss of security control 0.1642 0.25 0.25 0.5
Loss of demographic control 0.1233 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.6151 0.5521 0.4908
Israeli actions
I1. Rescind all legal and administrative measures and orders legislated by Israel since 1967
I2. Preserve and respect the status quo of the holy places in the city as decreed and 
accepted by the Ottomans and the international community in 1856.
I3. Demolish the separation wall around the city erected by Israel
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3. Erosion of national ethos.
4. Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic character.
Palestinian actions
1. Allowing Israel to choose between incremental and rapid removal of settlers/settle-
ments.
2. A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israel during the relocation pro-
cess and maintain a restrained approach toward the actual relocation.
3. Acknowledging the value of infrastructure, residential and commercial buildings and 
facilities, after Israeli withdraw.
Palestinian perspective
Benefits 
1. Repossession of land and natural resources.
2. Eliminate the harassment by the settlers.
3. Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development.
4. Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers).
Table 19 Israeli, Palestinian benefits and  costs, perceived benefits and  costs, and  gain 
ratios for Principle 3
Note that the Israeli bundle consisting of the pairs (I1, P1) and (I2, P2) yielding a gain of 2.735 is matched with the 
Palestinian bundle consisting of the pairs (I1, P1) and (I2, P2) yielding a gain of 2.801, which is within 2.5 % of each 
other, which is an acceptable ratio. Please note that the Israeli and Palestinian actions are listed in Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively















 1 0.45099442 0.810588685 365,570.9737 1 1 1,000,000
 2 1 0.716169725 716,169.7248 0.990938381 0.89757763 889,444.1231


















 1 1 1 1,000,000 1 1 1,000,000
 2 0.533333333 0.925888553 493,807.228 0.824247045 0.544142484 448,507.8349
P1 P2 Concessions Gain
Israeli ratios
 I1 2.735446936 1.226869383 Trade-off
 I2 1.396317054 0 Israeli 1, 2 2.735
 I3 1.698420413 0 Palestinian 1, 2 2.801
P1 P2
Palestinian ratios
 I1 1 2.025081739
 I2 0 1.801197052
 I3 0 1.594376003
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5. Psychological and social benefits.
6. Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity.
Costs 
1. Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation.
2. Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities.
Israeli Actions
1. Ensure that the infrastructure is preserved.
2. Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land.
3. Secure the evacuation process in regard to the Palestinian population.
Table 20 Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 5
Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Security benefits 0.0461 0.825 0.788 0.725
Social and Economic benefits 0.109 0.788 0.275 0.115
Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces 0.0585 0.588 0.825 0.078
Allow Israel to define its borders 0.2023 0.313 0.4 0.078
Increased international support 0.1837 0.213 0.788 0.033
Strengthen the democratic nature of the state of Israel 0.4004 0.563 0.563 0.01
0.4858 0.5653 0.0762
Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Economic cost to relocate the settlers 0.1282 0.563 0.563 0.275
Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror 0.5261 0.5 0.5 0.75
Erosion of national ethos 0.1208 0.788 0.6 0.4
Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic character 0.2248 0.275 0.5 0.5
0.4922 0.5201 0.5906
Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Repossession of land and natural resources 0.3167 0.862 0.725 0.563
Eliminate the harassment by the settlers 0.0775 0.75 0.5 0.888
Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development 0.15 0.85 0.725 0.438
Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers) 0.1171 0.463 0.95 0.863
Psychological and social benefits 0.0909 0.625 0.725 0.825
Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity 0.2478 0.175 0.01 0.055
0.6131 0.5567 0.5021
Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation 0.5074 0.193 0.825 0.115
Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities 0.4926 0.3 0.788 0.4
0.2455 0.8065 0.2554
Palestinian actions
P1. Allowing Israeli to choose between incremental and rapid removal of settlers/settlements
P2. A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israeli during the relocation process 
and maintaining a restrained approach toward the actual relocation
P3. Acknowledging the value of infrastructure, residential and commercial buildings and 
facilities, after Israeli withdrawal
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As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will 
be as follows:
Israeli actions
  • I2. Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land.
Palestinian actions
  • P2. A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israel during the relocation 
process and maintaining a restrained approach toward the actual relocation.
Principle 6 Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its out-
lets, and deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring sys-
tem in the Jordan Valley (see Tables 23, 24 and 25).
Table 21 Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 5
Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Repossession of land and natural resources 0.4034 0.9 0.9 0.9
Eliminate the harassment by the settlers 0.0552 0 0 0
Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development 0.0967 0.9 0.9 0.9
Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers) 0.1647 0.75 0.75 0.9
Psychological and social benefits 0.0196 0 0 0
Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity 0.2604 0.9 0.9 0.75
0.808 0.808 0.7936
Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation 0.5 1 0.5 0.9
Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities 0.5 1 0.75 0.75
1 0.625 0.825
Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Palestinian conces-
sions
Priorities P1 P2 P3
Security benefits 0.5537 0.5 0.75 0.9
Social and economic benefits 0.1119 0.75 0.75 0.75
Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces 0.0553 0 0 0
Allow Israel to define its borders 0.2534 0.5 0.01 0.01
Increased international support 0.0258 0 0 0
0.4874 0.5017 0.5848
Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Economic cost to relocate the settlers 0.6505 0.75 0.5 0.75
Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror 0.1557 0.75 0.75 0.75
Erosion of national ethos 0.0468 0.25 0.25 0.25
Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic process 0.147 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.6178 0.4552 0.6178
Israeli actions
I1. Ensure that the infrastructure is preserved
I2. Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land
I3. Secure the evacuation process in regard to the Palestinian population
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Israeli perspective
Benefits 
1. Economic gains from relinquishing control of the borders (typically realized in term 
of operational costs) (see Tables 23, 24 and 25).
2. International benefits.
a. Improved international relationship.
b. Removal of sanctions.
3. Removal of sanctions.
4. Tourism.
5. Trade.




b. Internal actors such as Hamas.
c. Non-state actors.
d. Third party actors.
2. Loss of control.
3. Movement.
4. Maintenance of borders.



















 1 0.833389773 1 833,389.7731 1 1 1,000,000
 2 0.880629868 0.908008481 799,619.3891 1 0.736808028 736,808.0285


















 1 1 0.833447332 833,447.3324 0.859366708 0.304401736 261,592.7177
 2 0.625 0.857900137 536,187.5855 1 1 1,000,000
 3 0.825 1 825,000 0.134795684 0.316676999 42,686.69265
Israeli ratios P1 P2 P3 Trade-off
 I1 0 1.199918732 0 Action Gain
 I2 0 1.250594988 0 Israeli I2 1.250595
 I3 0 1.2210715 0 Palestinian P2 1.374161
Palestinian ratios P1 P2 P3
 I1 1.199835864 1.865018936 1.212121212
 I2 0 1.374160925 0
 I3 1.17845265 1.831780974 1.190519052




1. Palestinian control over customs.
2. Limited arms—Principle 8.
3. Multi-national oversight—Principle 9.
4. Access to airspace for training.
5. Maintain borders with other countries.
Palestinian perspective
Benefits 
1. Economic gains internally and from controlling the borders: customs, relationships 
with neighboring countries.
2. International benefits: Open and establish international relationships and coopera-
tion with the world.
3. Creating a new positive climate for better relations and cooperation between the two 
parties.
4. Free movement of people and goods.
5. Development of tourism industry.
6. Trade: controlling import and export on the basis of mutual benefits.
7. Political stability.
8. Encouraging international investment.
Costs 
1. Running the border stations.
2. Manpower.
3. Political costs of engaging in early stages of the new situation with the Israelis.
Israeli actions
1. Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories.
2. Hand over fully the control point, border stations.
3. Provide Palestinians with all the information about the borders and passages.
4. Ensure no intervention what so ever in the border control points—respect the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Palestinian borders.
5. Any information or requests passed through official channels on Palestinian side.
As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will 
be as follows:
Israeli actions Gain Palestinian actions Gain
I2. Hand over fully the control point, border stations 1.4851 P3. Multi-national oversight: Principle 9 1.5348
I1. Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories
I5. Any information or requests passed through official 
channels on Palestinian side
1.2698 P2. Limited Arms: Principle 8
P4. Access to airspace for training
1.2103
Principle 7 Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner 
(see Tables 26, 27, 28 and 29).
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Israeli perspective
Benefits 
1. Preservation of the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel.
2. Compensation for Jews from Arab lands/recognition as refugees (in accordance with 
Israeli law requiring this issue be raised in context of I-P negotiations).
3. Starting reconciliation process with the Palestinian people.
4. International recognition of the finality of the refugee problems.
Table 23 Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 6
Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Economic gains from relinquishing control 0.1275 0.42 0.6 0.53 0.01 0.32
Improved international relationships 0.302 0.65 0.57 0.6 0.028 0.81
Removal of sanctions 0.0669 0.73 0.29 0.47 0.01 0.73
Tourism 0.1499 0.402 0.242 0.47 0.01 0.63
Trade 0.1591 0.55 0.01 0.112 0.01 0.27
Increased security cooperation 0.1946 0.55 0.98 0.87 0.47 0.55
0.5535 0.4966 0.5378 0.105 0.5787
Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
Security threat 0.5116 0.84 0.5 0.222 0.6 0.082
Loss of control 0.3104 0.81 0.75 0.22 0.7 0.16
Maintenance of borders 0.0922 0.56 0.45 0.18 0.55 0.1
Cooperation costs 0.0858 0.58 0.86 0.71 0.58 0.53
0.7826 0.6039 0.2594 0.6247 0.1463
Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli 
concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
Economic gains internally and from controlling the 
borders: FDI, customs, relationships with neighboring 
countries
0.1667 0.65 0.4 0.19 0.5 0.24
International benefits: open and establish international 
relationships and cooperation with the World
0.1424 0.81 0.55 0.32 0.24 0.16
Creating a new positive climate for better relations and 
cooperation between the two parties
0.2328 1 0.73 0.65 0.89 0.9
Free movement of people and goods 0.2464 1 0.96 0.45 0.222 0.472
Development of tourism industry 0.0799 0.4 0.81 0.32 0.29 0.224
Political stability 0.1318 0.93 0.6 0.16 0.65 0.046
0.8574 0.6953 0.3861 0.4883 0.4126
Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian 
concessions
Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Running the border stations 0.5547 0.55 0.55 0.84 0.082 0.89
Political Costs of engaging in early stages of the new situ-
ation with the Israelis
0.4453 0.272 0.7 0.45 0.84 0.29
0.4262 0.6168 0.6663 0.4195 0.6228
Palestinian actions
P1. Palestinian control over customs
P2. Limited Arms: Principle 8
P3. Multi-national oversight: Principle 9
P4. Access to airspace for training
P5. Maintain borders with other countries
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Table 24 Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 6
Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
Economic gains internally and from controlling the bor-
ders: customs, relationships with neighboring countries
0.3076 1 1 0.91 0.98 0.87
International benefits: Open and establish international 
relationships and cooperation with the world
0.0875 1 1 0.9 0.98 0.84
Creating a new positive climate for better relations and 
cooperation between the two parties
0.0403 0.94 0.98 0.9 0.98 0.86
Free movement of people and goods 0.2912 0.98 0.98 0.37 0.82 0.16
Development of tourism industry 0.0484 0.94 0.84 0.6 0.83 0.4
Trade: Controlling import and export on the basis of 
mutual benefits
0.0817 1 0.92 0.81 0.79 0.45
Political stability 0.119 1 0.93 0.71 0.91 0.84
Encouraging international investment 0.0243 0.95 0.88 0.76 0.78 0.66
0.9876 0.9679 0.7009 0.8974 0.5945
Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Running the border stations 0.5516 0.87 0.84 0.7 0.95 0.81
Manpower 0.2858 0.76 0.66 0.65 0.95 0.76
Political costs of engaging in early stages of the new situa-
tion with the Israelis
0.1627 0.35 0.76 0.73 0.88 0.73
0.754 0.7755 0.6906 0.9386 0.7827
Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Pales-
tinian concessions
Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
Economic gains from relinquishing control 0.2237 1 0.9 0.25 0.75 0.25
Improved international relationships 0.1759 0.75 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9
Removal of sanctions 0.0107 0 0 0 0 0
Movement 0.0241 0 0 0 0 0
Tourism 0.0542 0 0 0 0 0
Trade 0.1923 0.1 0.75 0.75 1 0.1
Cooperation 0.0167 0 0 0 0 0
Political 0.3025 0.1 0.9 0.9 1 0.1
0.4051 0.776 0.6306 0.7505 0.2637
Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli 
concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
Threat 0.0254 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of control 0.2777 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25
Movement 0.0748 0 0 0 0 0
Maintenance of borders 0.4573 1 0.75 0.75 0.01 0.5
Cooperation costs 0.0397 0 0 0 0 0
Political 0.1251 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.1
0.5279 0.4943 0.4943 0.1053 0.3106
Israeli actions
I1. Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories
I2. Hand over fully the control point, border stations
I3. Provide Palestinians with all the information about the borders and pas-
sages
I4. Ensure no intervention what so ever in the border control points: respect 
the independence and integrity of the Palestinian borders
I5. Any information or requests passed through official channels on Palestinian 
side
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Costs 
1. Destroying the Jewish democratic nature of the State of Israel.
2. Destruction of towns and villages of Israel and resettlement of millions of Israelis.
3. Creating new imminent friction between Israelis and Palestinians.
4. Political.
Table 25 Israeli, Palestinian benefits and  costs, perceived benefits and  costs, and  Gain 
Ratios for Principle 6















 I1 1 1 1,000,000 1 1 1,000,000
 I2 0.771658574 0.810940051 625,768.8436 0.980052653 0.936351582 917,673.8517
 I3 0.331459238 0.450314906 149,261.0356 0.709700284 0.936351582 664,528.983
 I4 0.798236647 0.56951248 454,605.7322 0.908667477 0.199469597 181,251.5349


















 PI 0.8033241 0.522036082 419,364.166 0.956454121 0.639651808 611,797.6084
 P2 0.826230556 1 826,230.5561 0.858130292 0.92570914 794,379.0547
 P3 0.735776689 0.812628866 597,913.3761 0.929324348 1 929,324.3477
 P4 1 0.967139175 967,139.1753 0.181441161 0.629596278 114,234.6798
 P5 0.833901556 0.339819588 283,376.0827 1 0.934714093 934,714.0928
Israeli ratios PI P2 P3 P4 P5
 I1 0 0 0 0 0
 I2 0 1.26944488 1.485092071 0 1.493705068
 I3 4.098843384 5.32207921 6.226168428 0 6.262277953
 I4 1.345776274 1.747402196 2.044242476 0 2.056098343
 15 6.800761553 8.83034268 10.33039882 1.269836311 10.3903114
Palestinian ratios PI P2 P3 P4 P5
 I1 2.384562347 1.210315925 1.672483072 1.033977348 3.528879327
 I2 2.188250514 1.110675277 1.534793982 0 3.238360284
 I3 1.584610792 0 1.111413475 0 2.34504259
 I4 0 0 0 0 0
 I5 0 0 0 0 1.249848504
Action Gain
Trade-off
 Israeli 12 1.485092071
 Palestinian P3 1.534793982
 Israeli 15 1.269836311
 Palestinian P4 0
 Israeli 11 0
 Palestinian P2 1.210315925
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5. To remain open to Palestinian claims.
6. Israel taking responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee issue will leave 
Israel solely responsible for solving the refugee issue financially and morally.
Palestinian actions
 1. Recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.
 2. Acknowledging the right of Palestinian refugees to return exclusively to the State of 
Palestine.
 3. Resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue will settle all claims, collective and indi-
vidual, of the Palestinian refugees.
 4. The State of Israel has the exclusive right to decide who returns or immigrates to the 
State of Israel.
 5. Claims for compensation of Palestinian refugees will be exclusively resolved by an 
agreed upon international mechanism with the participation and contribution of 
Israel.
 6. Israel’s contribution as defined by the agreement between the parties will be the total 
and final compensation to all claims.
 7. Within 5 years of the establishment of the international mechanism, UNRWA will 
dissolve and refugee status will be formally annulled.
 8. Palestinians will commit to a reconciliation process, conducted by a joint committee.
 9. Jewish refugees shall be compensated.




 1. Israeli acknowledgement of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem.
 2. End of suffering of the Palestinian people.
 3. End of conflict.
 4. Protecting, maintaining and enhancing the Palestinian social fabric.
 5. Returning Palestinian control over their destiny.
 6. Enabling the Palestinian people to have its share of regional development projects.
 7. Rehabilitating and integrating the refugees into the Palestinian society and else-
where.
 8. Peace and stability in the region.
 9. Contributing to the welfare of the host countries.
 10. Create a climate of mutual cooperation and normalization with Israel.
Costs 
1. Failure to resolve the refugee problem.
2. Undermining any other option for resolving the refugee problem.
3. Palestinian refugees considered as immigrants to Israel and not as people who have 
the right of return.
4. Denial of the Palestinian right to participate in the decision making for resolving the 
refugee problem.
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Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Preservation of 
the Jewish and 
democratic 
nature of Israel
0.6723 0.788 1 1 1 0.113 0.575 0.538 0.525 0.363 0.975
Compensation 










0.0853 0.625 0.313 0.763 0.538 0.663 0.563 0.862 1 0.862 0.862
International 
recognition of 
the finality of 
the refugee 
problems
0.1929 0.5 0.925 0.975 0.763 0.888 0.9 0.975 0.888 0.6 0.925
0.6836 0.883 0.9471 0.8665 0.3263 0.6218 0.6336 0.6244 0.4825 0.9162
Israeli costs from Israeli 
concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Destroying the Jewish 
democratic nature of 
the State of Israel
0.3833 1 0.112 0 0.8 0.075 0.275
Destruction of towns and 
villages of Israel and 
resettlement of millions 
of Israelis
0.3289 0.975 0.025 0.088 0.913 0.088 0.213
Creating new imminent 
friction between Israelis 
and Palestinians
0.0631 0.975 0.075 0.188 0.538 0.112 0.313
Political 0.037 0.925 0.112 0.112 0.925 0.15 0.088
To remain open to Pales-
tinian claims
0.1 1 79 0.338 0.625 0.5 0.888 0.075 0.25
Israel taking responsibility 
for the creation of the 
Palestinian refugee issue
0.0698 0.925 0.625 0.215 0.763 0.153 0.34
0.9041 0.1776 0.1187 0.8328 0.0897 0.2515
Israeli perceived Palestin-
ian benefits from Israeli 
concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Israeli acknowledgement 
of its responsibility for 
the Palestinian refugee 
problem
0.1499 0.95 0.463 0.025 0.888 0.112 0.438
End of suffering of the Pales-
tinian people
0.2003 0.925 0.763 0.5 0.625 0.8 0.862
End of conflict 0.066 0.9 0 0 0 0 0
Protecting, maintaining and 
enhancing the Palestinian 
social fabric
0.0803 0 0.563 0.663 0.763 0.788 0.4
Retaining Palestinian control 
over their destiny
0.1627 0.463 0.6 0.663 0.888 0.688 0.5
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Israeli perceived Palestin-
ian benefits from Israeli 
concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Enabling the Palestinian 
people to have its share 
of regional development 
projects
0.0476 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rehabilitating and integrat-
ing the refugees into the 
Palestinian society and 
elsewhere
0.1439 0.275 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.788
Peace and stability in the 
region
0.0446 0.663 0.663 0.825 0.7 0.825 0.663
Contributing to the welfare 
of the host countries
0.0283 0 0 0 0 0 0
Create a climate of mutual 
cooperation and normali-
zation with Israel
0.0764 0.4 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.825 0.538





Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Failure to resolve the 
refugee problem
0.287 0.8 0.425 0.15 0.862 0.625 0.625 0.725 0.25 0.313 0.763
Undermining any 
other option for 
resolving the refu-
gee problem
0.1173 0.862 0.95 0.075 0.1 0.025 0.338 0.4 0.025 0.125 0.5
Palestinian refugees 
considered as 
immigrants to Israel 
and not as people 
who have the right 
of return
0.0315 0.825 0.725 0.1 0.088 0.05 0 0.088 0.05 0.025 0.338
Denial of the 
Palestinian right to 
participate in the 
decision making 
for resolving the 
refugee problem
0.1092 0.825 0.85 0.563 0.9 0.238 0.275 0.275 0.05 0 0.075
Dissolving UNRWA 
before the final 
resolution of the 
refugee problem 
and ending the sta-
tus of the refugees 
as refugees
0.0634 0.195 0.09 0.1 0.37 0.375 0.115 0.225 0.255 0 0.05
Exacerbation of 
the suffering of 
the refugees as a 
result of dissolving 
UNRWA before the 
final settlement of 
the claims
0.0668 0.065 0.5 0.05 0.338 0.24 0.155 0.625 0.05 0 0.025
Potential for not 
implementing the 
agreement
0.3248 0.9 0.862 0.028 0.378 0.277 0.215 0.215 0.125 0.313 0.528
0.7559 0.6683 0.1351 0.5289 0.3398 0.3365 0.4136 0.1418 0.2066 0.4725
Table 26 continued
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Table 27 Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 7
Palestinian benefits 
from Israeli concessions
Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Israeli acknowledgement of its 
responsibility for the Palestin-
ian refugee problem
0.3099 0.663 0.438 0.338 0.75 0.725 0.925
End of suffering of the Palestin-
ian people
0.1067 0.725 0.788 0.725 0.9 0.862 0.862
End of conflict 0.0396 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protecting, maintaining and 
enhancing the Palestinian 
social fabric
0.0909 0.7 0.725 0.688 0.788 0.663 0.862
Retaining Palestinian control 
over their destiny
0.2104 0.563 0.725 0.788 0.688 0.5 0.725
Enabling the Palestinian people 
to have its share of regional 
development projects
0.0312 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rehabilitating and integrating 
the refugees into the Palestin-
ian society and elsewhere
0.1134 0.438 0.788 0.825 0.763 0.888 0.913
Peace and stability in the region 0.0511 0.725 0.788 0.888 0.825 0.888 0.862
Contributing to the welfare of 
the host countries
0.0133 0 0 0 0 0 0
Create a climate of mutual 
cooperation and normaliza-
tion with Israel
0.0336 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5513 0.5675 0.549 0.6733 0.6281 0.7571
Palestinian costs from Palestinian 
concessions
Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Failure to resolve the refugee problem 0.0788 1 1 0 1 0 0.9 0.9 1 1 0
Undermining any other option for 
resolving the refugee problem
0.3502 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.75 0.9 1 0.9 0 0.9
Palestinian refugees considered as 
immigrants to Israel and not as peo-
ple who have the right of return
0.1763 1 1 1 1 0.9 1 1 1 1 0.9
Denial of the Palestinian right to 
participate in the decision making for 
resolving the refugee problem
0.3072 1 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 0.75 1 0.9 1 0.9
Dissolving UNRWA before the final 
resolution of the refugee problem 
and ending the status of the refu-
gees as refugees
0.0281 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.9 0.75 1 0.9
Exacerbation of the suffering of the 
refugees as a result of dissolving 
UNRWA before the final settlement 
of the claims
0.0449 1 1 0.9 1 0.75 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0.75
Potential for not implementing the 
agreement
0.0144 1 1 0.9 1 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.9





Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Preservation of the 
Jewish and demo-
cratic nature of Israel
0.6802 0.1 1 0.75 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 0 1
Compensation for 
Jews from Arab 
lands/recognition as 
refugee
0.0322 0 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.9 0 0
Starting reconciliation 
process with the 
Palestinian people
0.0925 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.1 0.5 0 0.75
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5. Dissolving UNRWA before the final resolution of the refugee problem and ending 
the status of the refugees as refugees.
6. Exacerbation of the suffering of the refugees as a result of dissolving UNRWA before 
the final settlement of the claims.
7. Potential for not implementing the agreement.
Israeli actions
1. Right to choose to return to their original home.
2. Right to choose to resettle in the State of Palestine, the host countries or third coun-
tries.
3. Endorsement of the international community.
4. Endorsement of the Palestinian refugees comprehensive and individual justice.
5. International commission to develop opportunities for the refugees.






Priorities P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
International recogni-
tion of the finality of 
the refugee problem
0.1951 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.9 0 0.75





Priorities I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
Destroying the 
Jewish charac-
ter of the State 
of Israel
0.3498 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 0
Destruction of 
towns and 
villages of Israel 
and resettle-
ment of millions 
of Israelis






0.0446 0.75 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
Political 0.1433 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.25 0.75
To remain open 
to Palestinian 
claims
0.2069 0.9 0.5 0 0.25 0.75 0.1
Israel taking 
responsibility for 
the creation of 
the Palestinian 
refugee issue
0.2229 0.9 0 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.1
0.836 0.2097 0.126 0.295 0.2467 0.1505
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Matched concessions
Israeli actions Gain Palestinian actions Gain
I1. Right to choose to return 
to their original home
0 P9. Jewish refugees shall be 
compensated
8.595
I3. Endorsement of the 
international community
1.965 P3. Resolution of the Pales-
tinian refugee issue will 
settle all claims, collective 
and individual, of the 
Palestinian refugees
0
I5. International commission 
to develop opportunities 
for the refugees
8.302 P1. Recognition of Israel as 




Principles to solve the Palestinian refugee problem
  • The Palestinian refugees can choose to resettle in the State of Palestine, other host 
countries, or third party countries; those Palestinians who were originally displaced 
according to UNRWA’s registry from the area inside the Green Line and their 
spouse will be permitted to return to the State of Israel within 5  years. Palestin-
Table 28 Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs for Principle 7















 I1 1 0.84689572 846,895.7203 0.728173293 1 728,173.2928
 I2 0.196438447 0.881555154 173,171.3254 0.74957073 0.250837321 188,020.3136
 I3 0.131290786 0.692736588 90,949.93146 0.725135385 0.150478469 109,117.2625
 I4 0.921137042 1 921,137.0424 0.889314489 0.352870813 313,813.1273
 I5 0.099214689 0.876280892 86,939.93587 0.829612997 0.295095694 244,815.2229


















 PI 0.965 0.156155821 150,690.3672 0.721782283 1 721,782.2828
 P2 0.9623 0.87420471 841,247.1928 0.932319713 0.884111655 824,274.7243
 P3 0.8425 0.79339212 668,432.8608 1 0.178727345 178,727.3449
 P4 1 0.901886371 901,886.3712 0.91489811 0.699695727 640,150.2982
 P5 0.7656 0.960263422 735,177.6761 0.344525393 0.449530361 154,874.6245
 P6 0.8673 0.960263422 832,836.4661 0.656530461 0.445164704 292,264.1887
 P7 0.9848 0.878446255 865,093.8721 0.668989547 0.547162323 366,045.8747
 P8 0.9213 0.963277151 887,467.2396 0.659275684 0.187590951 123,674.1526
 P9 0.6498 0.130371693 84715.52629 0.5094499 0.273316576 139,241.1024
 P10 0.8223 1 822300 0.967374089 0.625082683 604,688.7911
Page 47 of 53Saaty et al. Decis. Anal.  (2015) 2:7 
ian refugees will be eligible for citizenship of the state they choose to resettle in or 
return to.
  • All refugees have the right to compensation for their suffering and loss of property. 
An agreed upon international commission will handle all claims and implementa-
tion.
While the participants spent considerable time in developing the principles noted 
above to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, it became clear that these principles 
were actually guidelines to approach that problem and did not represent a totally imple-
mentable program. Still ahead will be a series of meetings to address the following issues 
which, when resolved, would hopefully yield the details of a workable program. These 
issues would be addressed in the following order:
1. How can we satisfy the Palestinian narrative about the importance of the right of 
return? We have already completed some aspects of this question in our last meeting.
2. How do we get information from the refugees themselves about what their needs and 
preferences are? And how do we get in touch with refugees in camps and who would 
they have confidence in talking to?




P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Israelis’ concessions
 I1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 I2 4.168024 4.75988 1.032084 3.69663 0 1.687717 2.113779 0 0 3.491853
 I3 7.93604 9.06295 1.965118 7.038491 1.702856 3.213462 4.024697 1.359805 1.530964 6.64859
 I4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 I5 8.30208 9.480968 2.055757 7.363133 1.781398 3.361679 4.210331 1.422524 1.601578 6.955248
 I6 3.214174 3.670584 0 2.850658 0 1.301484 1.630042 0 0 2.692744
Palestinian’s ratios Palestinian’s concessions
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Israelis’ concessions
 I1 4.832248 0 1.089374 0 0 0 0 0 8.595512 0
 I2 1.247726 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.219432 0
 I3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.288043 0
 I4 2.082503 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.704317 0
 I5 1.624624 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.889851 0
 I6 1.194661 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.12504 0
Trade-off Action Gain Total
Israeli II 0 10.2672
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3. How and where to resettle the refugees currently in camps and how can they be 
appropriately housed and given employment opportunities?
4. How can we compensate Palestinian refugees for the losses they have incurred, 
including who will be compensated, how much will they receive and where will the 
resources come from?
When this work is completed, the parties will have in hand a proposal for an approach, 
which is fair to both sides.
Principle 8 Limited Arms of the Palestinian state and international guarantees from 
the international community against aggression from other parties (see Tables  30, 31 
and 32).
Table 30 Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 8
Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians 0.3278 1 0.975 0.862
No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military 0.1883 0.563 0.525 1
Sense of security 0.1726 0.975 1 0.862
Using Palestinian airspace for military training 0.3113 0.938 0.033 0.07
0.8939 0.6012 0.6417
Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Threat 0.4448 1 0.01 0.725
Loss of control 0.4757 0.888 0.375 0.825
Redeployment and restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status 0.0795 0.813 0 0
0.9316 0.1828 0.715
Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military 
expenditures
0.5978 0.195 0.01 0.663
Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine 0.1127 0.725 0.925 0.888
Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guaran-
tees
0.2895 0.318 0.725 0.862
0.2902 0.3201 0.7458
Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Risk associated with limited national defense 0.11 0.725 0.563 0.1
Political cost associated with the limitations of arms 0.2364 0.725 0.5 0.5
Financial burden incurred by the international community and to be shared 
by the State of Palestine
0.1688 0.033 0.502 0.313
National pride undermined by limited arms policy 0.4849 0.75 0.1 0.725
0.6203 0.3133 0.5335
Palestinian actions
P1. List of forbidden weapons





 (a) Private groups
P3. Multinational monitoring (Principle 9)
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Israeli perspective
Benefits 
1. Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians.
2. No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military assistance.
3. Social psyche: without the threat of military presence the social psyche will be 
relieved (sense of security).
4. Using Palestinian airspace for military training.
5. Allows for finalization of the conflict.
Costs 
1. Lack of control.
2. Threat.
3. Political.
4. Restructuring of how to ‘deal’ with the new status.
Table 31 Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 8
Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military expen-
ditures
0.2176 0.9 0.9 0.9
Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine 0.0503 1 1 0.9
Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guarantees 0.7322 1 1 0.9
0.9782 0.9782 0.9
Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Risk associated with limited national defense 0.6668 0.9 0.5 0.5
Political cost associated with the limitations of arms 0.2181 0.75 0.75 0.75
Financial burden incurred by the international community and to be shared 
by the State of Palestine
0.0376 0.25 0.25 0.25
National pride undermined by limited arms policy 0.0775 0.75 0.75 0.75
0.8312 0.5645 0.5645
Palestinian perception of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions Priorities P1 P2 P3
Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians 0.2389 0.75 0.75 0.9
No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military 0.0478 0 0 0
Social psyche: without the threat of military presence the social psyche will 
be relieved
0.1082 1 0.75 0.9
Using Palestinian airspace for military training 0.0222 0 0 0
Allows for finalization of the conflict 0.5828 0.9 0.75 0.9
0.8119 0.6975 0.837
Palestinian perception of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions Priorities I1 I2 I3
Threat 0.0377 0.25 0.01 0.01
Loss of control 0.0998 0.01 0.01 0.01
Restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status 0.5986 0.1 0.01 0.1
Political 0.2639 0.5 0.5 0.25
0.2023 0.1393 0.1272
Israeli actions
1. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading air space
2. Israel should abide by the international commitment to support principle 8
3. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading borders
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Palestinian actions





2. Monitoring by private groups.
3. Multinational monitoring (Principle 9).
Palestinian perspective
Benefits 
1. Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military expenditures.
2. Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine.
3. Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guarantees.
Costs 
1. Threat.
2. Loss of control.
3. Redeployment and restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status.
Table 32 Israeli, Palestinian benefits and  costs, perceived benefits and  costs, and  gain 
ratios for Principle 8














 1 1 0.389112363 389,112.3626 1 1 1,000,000
 2 0.196221554 0.42920354 84,218.9857 1 0.688581315 688,581.3149

















 1 1 0.970011947 970,011.9474 1 1 1,000,000
 2 0.679138595 0.833333333 565,948.829 0.672558452 0.505078188 339,694.6041
 3 0.679138595 1 679,138.5948 0.717865533 0.860067709 617,412.9645
Israeli ratios P1 P2 P3
I1 2.569951757 0 1.586721533
I2 11.87380721 4.033468241 7.331042512
I3 1.302937063 0 0
Palestinian ratios P1 P2 P3
I1 1.030915137 1.766944198 1.472453499
I2 0 1.216684759 1.013903966




Page 51 of 53Saaty et al. Decis. Anal.  (2015) 2:7 
Israeli actions
1. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading air space.
2. Israel should abide by the international commitment to support principle 8.
3. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading borders.
As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will 
be as follows:
Israeli actions
•  Israeli commitment not to violate the borders of the State of Palestine.
Palestinian actions
•  Multi-national oversight—Principle 9.
Principle 9 Agreed upon international monitoring mechanism and agreed upon bind-
ing international arbitration mechanisms.
What is needed for the implementation of this principle is:
  • Monitor and verify the implementation of the agreement.
  • Time table for the implementation of the agreement.
  • International arbitration mechanism to deal with any problems arising during imple-
mentation of agreements based on differences in interpretations.
Conclusions and recommendations
The outcomes noted previously represent a first step at producing a solution to the con-
troversy, which can be used as a basis for further negotiation. With the exception of the 
refugee problem, it postulates what could be considered as a first draft for a proposal 
that would end hostilities. AHP has provided a solution which has drained much of the 
emotionality as it is possible in such circumstances. It has structured the problem much 
more efficiently than traditional face to face negotiations have been able to provide. At 
the same time, it has utilized a more refined measurement technique that makes it possi-
ble to compare the benefits and costs which each side sees as the result of the judgments 
they have made. When the total implementation of the refugee issue is completed, which 
may take another year, we will have produced, through AHP, an implementable proposal 
to begin a new era in the Middle East.
Over the last six decades, a veritable plethora of negotiators, presidents, foreign 
ministers, organizations like the United Nations, groups of allied countries, etc. have 
attempted to create peace in Israel and Palestine. However, no matter how worthy their 
intentions were, they have all failed. The basic premise of these negotiations has been 
that the way to a solution required an outside party to convince the principals to gather 
in the same room and begin negotiating. The outside parties then left the negotiators to 
attack one or more of the issues, together or separately, and find an acceptable outcome. 
While some progress was made using this approach, it was never an outcome which 
came even close to providing the necessary solution.
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So what is it we have produced that will move the process ahead to a point beyond 
what had been achieved to date? The AHP solution will eventually provide a proposal, 
with many of the details in place. It will suggest exactly where the borders should be 
for each country. It will drive away most of the emotionality from the discussions. It 
will identify which settlements will remain in Israeli possession and which will need, to 
either be closed or the communities remain in place, but under Palestinian sovereignty. 
It will suggest exactly how much land now owned by the Palestinians, but in the future 
will be occupied by the Israelis, needs to be counterbalanced by giving Israeli land to 
the Palestinians. It will evaluate the land offered for such land swaps in a mode that will 
be satisfactory to the Palestinian side. It will identify East Jerusalem as the capital of the 
Palestinian State, but will maintain the status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.
It will permit the Palestinians to acknowledge the existence of Israel as a Jewish 
State while guaranteeing the rights of its minority citizens. It will guarantee that Israel 
will respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage 
between the two areas. It will guarantee the evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Pales-
tinian territories that are not included in the land swaps. It will guarantee that the Pales-
tinians will be in full control of the Palestinian State border and its outlets. It will permit 
the deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring system 
in the Jordan Valley. It will limit the arms permitted to the Palestinian state and provide 
international guarantees against aggression from other parties. It will identify the pro-
cess by which both communities will have access to the holy places.
Eventually it will outline a specific outcome whereby some Palestinian refugees have 
the option to return to live in Israel if they wish. It will also address the question of what 
compensation should be paid to which refugees and how they might be resettled in other 
countries or territories. This portion of the work remains to be completed.
One may ask whether this constitutes a complete solution to the problem at hand. The 
answer is an obvious no. Many details remain to be settled. Some disagreement among 
the official negotiators will inevitably require modification of parts of the outcomes 
noted above. There also is the question of whether a different set of participants express-
ing different judgments may reach different conclusions. While that may be true, the 
credibility of the current participants suggests that the outcomes might be quite similar. 
But even if that is not the case, we will produce, through AHP, an outcome that provides 
an implementable alternative solution. No matter how the outcomes are produced, what 
the actual negotiators will have in hand is an implementable or partially implementable 
proposal that has been provided by knowledgeable people on both sides and supported 
by a far more scientific approach, using quantitative and computer technology, than has 
ever been attempted before. It is far more likely that a group of negotiators reviewing a 
detailed, specific and implementable solution will be able to modify it towards a final 
agreement than if they were starting from scratch in trying to develop a solution without 
structural foundation and judgments which are unique to AHP. After 60 years of trying 
the parties might be well advised to think outside of the box and look at the picture with 
a different focus.
One may skeptically argue that even with such a cool-headed rational agreement 
between the two sides, negatives have so dominated the scene, since the beginning, that 
what one has done on paper will encounter such resistance that people would give up 
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and the conflict would continue. Whatever solution is provided, it will inevitably require 
a vote by the populations of both sides. Even if the Gaza population would vote nega-
tive, on the recommendation of its Hamas constituency, the proposal might be approved 
by an overriding positive vote of its West Bank constituency. Similarly, certain groups 
within the Israeli side will likely vote negative. However, using democratic principles, 
the majority should prevail, even if the vote is close. Just how strong the residents of 
Israel and Palestine feel about the advantages of peace versus the current conflict will 
be recorded in the vote. If the vote is close, one or both sides will have an implementa-
tion problem that would certainly be difficult. If the popular vote is positive on one side 
and negative on the other, the negotiators will have to go back to work. But, at least, the 
populations will have had a chance to express their democratic position. Getting to that 
stage of the negotiations would be a step forward that might suggest sufficient momen-
tum to adjust the proposal enough to engender majority support.
Thinking outside of the box is always painful and breeds uncertainty. An AHP-derived 
solution will certainly be a novel way of ending the controversy, but when all else has 
failed, summoning the courage to consider unique approaches may be what is called for 
in these dire circumstances.
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